Book Review - Hamilton and Herwig

Decisions for War, 1914-1917

In the book, Decisions for War, Richard Hamilton and Roger Herwig argue that the rush to battle was a result of the decision making of just a few individuals. While a quick glance at the cover and the summary narrative indicates a dry academic publication, I was surprised to find that it reads surprisingly well. By reducing the story to a few, very influential people, they had the capacity to deeply explore the inner dealings of these leaders, which introduces an interesting personal element. There were times that I felt that I was actually at the table sitting with Kaiser Wilhelm II or Lord Gray, going over telegrams and coordinating strategy. History books have a tendency to give so many facts that they overwhelm the readers. For instance, David Herrmann's The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War provides the reader with an incredible amount of information; numbers, statistics, hundreds of names, events, and documents. While this information is good to have, I wasn't sure how it all related to the broader perspective.

Hamilton and Herwig break each chapter up to focus on a certain country. While Herrmann would take issue with this technique, it does make it easy to follow their argument. It was convenient to read about one specific country's path to war and get familiar with its respective characteristics before moving on to the next country. By the end, it still provided a general outlook as to how all these European countries came to fight WW1, and in my opinion is much easier and more effective for the recreational scholar -- someone that wants to learn more about WWI but is not yet an expert.

Hamilton and Herwig argue that the decision for war was made by a small group of autocratic leaders with little to no interaction with citizen representation. For instance, they bring up the Tsar of Russia in 1905, who declared he would pay the constitution little attention. They mention that the German Kaiser had sole power to enter into war and peace agreements. Even France and England gave their power of war declaration to the Prime Minister. However, I think they expand this theory too much, to the point that they fall into their own trap. In their introduction, they explain that the alliance system, the "slide" into war, and the mass demands of nationalism and militarism do not fully answer how WWI got to the point it did. Yet their argument is just as incomplete as the ones they list. Yes, a small number of leaders got Europe into war, but I do not agree that this is the one and only answer. Personally, I am always leery when a scholar or author tries to pinpoint one aspect of a large event and claim that that aspect trumps all others. The interesting thing about history is the different approaches that authors take towards the same subject, and it is important to examine the thesis of the book and compare it to what you know about the subject. In my case, I am relatively familiar with the major events of the war itself and the build-up of alliances, but this went into detail on one aspect of the "powder keg." It undoubtedly made me think about the common understanding of the war, and I feel that I can now put some of the major concepts (nationalism, militarism and social Darwinism) into a clearer context.

This book goes deep into the mindset of the leaders of the major countries in Europe, but as a relative novice in WWI affairs I do not know if any of the parts are exaggerated or sensationalized, a strong possibility when an author attempts to delve into such things as dialogue between leaders. Part of the problem lies in the fact that Hamilton and Herwig do not provide any sources or documents to support their argument, and it is difficult to see how much of this is a stretch. I do not see anything to indicate that they are pushing the limits of their thesis, but at the same time I am not sure that some of the events and conversations they brought up are completely accurate or supported with evidence. For instance, Hamilton dismisses the many historical accounts that indicate that "war euphoria" was prevalent by simply providing the last name of five German scholars who think otherwise. He goes further by saying "one scholar puts the figure at 100,000 in Berlin alone and at 750,000 throughout Germany" (referencing peace demonstrations). Who is this scholar? Where does this scholar say this? In addition, he uses this one sentence to claim that "available documentary evidence does not allow the conclusion that the 'men of 1914' were responding to the public opinion in deciding for war (80-81)." I find Hamilton and Herwig's thesis weak at times, and do not think that spending one paragraph on nationalism in Germany (upon which entire books are written) is sufficient. This book does not adequately address contrary views, but instead glosses over many important details that do not fit into their thesis.

The Decisions for War is very informative, and I would recommend this to anyone that already has a basic, recreational understanding of WWI and wants to move into the scholarly realm. The reason for this suggestion is that Hamilton and Herwig bring up many references to commonly understood theories of WWI, and it would be difficult for anyone without this background to follow. However, this book will provide any reader a thorough understanding of WWI and many of the key decisions that preceded it. While I agree with their thesis in general, I think they over-stretch by claiming that their theory is any more powerful or compelling than such causes as nationalism, militarism or social Darwinism. Overall, I am glad I read this book and learned quite a bit how certain aspects that you normally would not think about can have major impacts on history itself.